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Abstract. In this paper, we show how game-theoretic work on conversation com-
bined with a theory of discourse structure provides a framework for studying
interpretive bias. Interpretive bias is an essential feature of learning and under-
standing but also something that can be used to pervert or subvert the truth. The
framework we develop here provides tools for understanding and analyzing the
range of interpretive biases and the factors that contribute to them.
1 Introduction
Bias is generally considered to be a negative term: a biased story is seen as one that
perverts or subverts the truth by offering a partial or incomplete perspective on the
facts. But bias is in fact essential to understanding: one cannot interpret a set of facts—
something humans are disposed to try to do even in the presence of data that is nothing
but noise [38]—without relying on a bias or hypothesis to guide that interpretation.
Suppose someone presents you with the sequence 0,1,1,2,3 and tells you to guess
the next number. To make an educated guess, you must understand this sequence as
instantiating a particular pattern; otherwise, every possible continuation of the sequence
will be equally probable for you. Formulating a hypothesis about what pattern is at work
will allow you to predict how the sequence will play out, putting you in a position to
make a reasonable guess as to what comes after 3. Formulating the hypothesis that this
sequence is structured by the Fibonacci function (even if you don’t know its name), for
example, will lead you to guess that the next number is 5; formulating the hypothesis
that the sequence is structured by the successor function but that every odd successor is
repeated once will lead you to guess that it is 3. Detecting a certain pattern allows you
to determine what we will call a history: a set of given entities or eventualities and a set
of relations linking those entities together. The sequence of numbers 0,1,1,2,3 and the
set of relation instances that the Fibonacci sequence entails as holding between them is
one example of a history. Bias, then, is the set of features, constraints, and assumptions
that lead an interpreter to select one history—one way of stitching together a set of
observed data—over another.3
Bias is also operative in linguistic interpretation. An interpreter’s bias surfaces, for
example, when the interpreter connects bits of information content together to resolve
ambiguities. Consider:
3 In machine learning and statistics, ‘bias’ often refers to the divergence between an estimated
hypothesis about a parameter and its objective value. We use ‘bias’ to refer to the features and
assumptions that lead one to formulate a hypothesis in the first place.
(1) Julie isn’t coming. The meeting has been cancelled.
While these clauses are not explicitly connected, an interpreter will typically have an-
tecedent biases that lead her to interpret eventualities described by the two clauses as
figuring in one of two histories: one in which the eventuality described by the first clause
caused the second, or one in which the second caused the first. Any time that structural
connections are left implicit by speakers—and this is much if not most of the time in
text— interpreters will be left to infer these connections and thereby potentially create
their own history or version of events.
Every model of data, every history over that data, comes with a bias that allows
us to use observed facts to make predictions; bias even determines what kind of predic-
tions the model is meant to make. Bayesian inference, which underlies many powerful
models of inference and machine learning, likewise relies on bias in several ways: the
estimate of a state given evidence depends upon a prior probability distribution over
states, on assumptions about what parameters are probabilistically independent, and on
assumptions about the kind of conditional probability distribution that each parame-
ter abides by (e.g., normal distribution, noisy-or, bimodal). Each of these generates a
(potentially different) history.
1.1 Objective of the paper
In this paper, we propose a program for research on bias. We will show how to model
various types of bias as well as the way in which bias leads to the selection of a history
for a set of data, where the data might be a set of nonlinguistic entities or a set of lin-
guistically expressed contents. In particular, we’ll look at what people call “unbiased”
histories. For us these also involve a bias, what we call a “truth seeking bias”. This is a
bias that gets at the truth or acceptably close to it. Our model can show us what such a
bias looks like. And we will examine the question of whether it is possible to find such
a truth oriented bias for a set of facts, and if so, under what conditions. Can we detect
and avoid biases that don’t get at the truth but are devised for some other purpose?
Our study of interpretive bias relies on three key premises. The first premise is that
histories are discursive interpretations of a set of data in the sense that like discourse in-
terpretations, they link together a set of entities with semantically meaningful relations.
As such they are amenable to an analysis using the tools used to model a discourse’s
content and structure. The second is that a bias consists of a purpose or goal that the
histories it generates are built to achieve and that agents build histories for many dif-
ferent purposes—to discover the truth or to understand, but also to conceal the truth,
to praise or disparage, to persuade or to dissuade. To properly model histories and the
role of biases in creating them, we need a model of the discourse purposes to whose
end histories are constructed and of the way that they, together with prior assumptions,
shape and determine histories. The third key premise of our approach is that bias is
manifested in and conveyed through histories, and so studying histories is crucial for a
better understanding of bias.
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1.2 Some examples of bias
Let’s consider the following example of biased interpretation of a conversation. Here is
an example analyzed in [7] to which we will return in the course of the paper.
(2) a. Reporter: On a different subject is there a reason that the Senator won’t
say whether or not someone else bought some suits for him?
b. Sheehan: Rachel, the Senator has reported every gift he has ever received.
c. Reporter: That wasn’t my question, Cullen.
d. Sheehan: (i) The Senator has reported every gift he has ever received. (ii)
We are not going to respond to unnamed sources on a blog.
e. Reporter: So Senator Coleman’s friend has not bought these suits for him?
Is that correct?
f. Sheehan: The Senator has reported every gift he has ever received.
Sheehan continues to repeat, “The Senator has reported every gift he has ever received”
seven more times in two minutes to every follow up question by the reporter corps.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VySnpLoaUrI. For convenience, we denote this
sentence uttered by Sheehan (which is an EDU in the languare of SDRT as we shall see
presently) as α.
Now imagine two “juries,” onlookers or judges who interpret what was said and
evaluate the exchange, yielding differing interpretations. The interpretations differ prin-
cipally in how the different contributions of Sheehan and the reporter hang together. In
other words, the different interpretations provide different discourse structures that we
show schematically in the graphs below. The first is one in which Sheehan’s response
α in (2)b is somewhat puzzling and not taken as an answer to the reporter’s question
in (2)a. In effect this “jury” could be the reporter herself. This Jury then interprets the
move in (2)c as a correction of the prior exchange. The repetition of α in (2)d.ii is taken
tentatively as a correction of the prior exchange (that is, the moves (2)a, (2)b and (2)c
together), which the Jury then takes the reporter to try to establish with (2)e. When
Sheehan repeats (2)a again in (2)f, this jury might very well take Sheehan to be evading
all questions on the subject.
A different Jury, however, might have a different take on the conversation as de-
picted in the discourse structure below. Such a jury might take α to be at least an indirect
answer to the question posed in (2)a, and as a correction to the Reporter’s evidently not
taking α as an answer. The same interpretation of α would hold for this Jury when it
is repeated in (2)f. Such a Jury would be a supporter of Sheehan or even Sheehan him-
self. What accounts for these divergent discourse structures? We will argue that it is
the biases of the two Juries that create these different interpretations. And these biases
are revealed at least implicitly in how they interpret the story: Jury 1 is at the outset
at least guarded, if not skeptical, in its appraisal of Sheehan’s interest in answering the
reporter’s questions. On the other hand, Jury 2 is fully convinced of Sheehan’s position
and thus interprets his responses much more charitably. [7] shows formally that there
is a co-dependence between biases and interpretations; a certain interpretation created
because of a certain bias can in turn strengthen that bias, and we will sketch some of
the details of this story below.
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The situation of our two juries applies to a set of nonlinguistic facts. In such a
case we take our “jury” to be the author of a history over that set of facts. The jury
in this case evaluates and interprets the facts just as our juries did above concerning
linguistic messages. To tell a history about a set of facts is to connect them together just
as discourse constituents are connected together. And these connections affect and may
even determine the way the facts are conceptualized [39]. Facts typically do not wear
their connections to other facts on their sleeves and so how one takes those connections
to be is often subject to bias. Even if their characterization and their connections to
other facts are “intuitively clear”, our jury may choose to pick only certain connections
to convey a particular history or even to make up connections that might be different.
One jury might build a history over the set of facts that conveys one set of ideas, while
the other might build a quite different history with a different message. Such histories
reflect the purposes and assumptions that were exploited to create that structure.
As an example of this, consider the lead paragraphs of articles from the New York
Times, Townhall andNewsbusters concerning theMarch for Science held in April, 2017.
The March for Science on April 22 may or may not accomplish the goals set out by its
organizers. But it has required many people who work in a variety of scientific fields —
as well as Americans who are passionate about science — to grapple with the proper
role of science in our civic life. The discussion was evident in thousands of responses
submitted to NYTimes.com ahead of the march, both from those who will attend and
those who are sitting it out.
–New York Times
Do you have march fatigue yet? The left, apparently, does not, so we’re in for some
street theater on Earth Day, April 22, with the so-called March for Science. It’s hard to
think of a better way to undermine the public’s faith in science than to stage demonstra-
tions in Washington, D.C., and around the country modeled on the Women’s March on
Washington that took place in January. The Women’s March was an anti-Donald Trump
festival. Science, however, to be respected, must be purely the search for truth. The
organizers of this “March for Science” – by acknowledging that their demonstration
is modeled on the Women’s March – are contributing to the politicization of science,
exactly what true upholders of science should be at pains to avoid.
–Townhall
Thousands of people have expressed interest in attending the March for Science this
Earth Day, but internally the event was fraught with conflict and many actual scientists
rejected the march and refused to participate.
–Newsbusters
These different articles begin with some of the same basic facts: the date and purpose
of the march, and the fact that the march’s import for the science community is contro-
versial, for example. But bias led the reporters to stitch together very different histories.
The New York Times, for instance, interprets the controversy as generating a serious
discussion about “the proper role of science in our civic life,” while Townhall interprets
the march as a political stunt that does nothing but undermine science.
While the choice of wording helps to convey bias, just as crucial is the way that
the reporters portray the march as being related to other events. Which events authors
choose to include in their history, which they leave out, and the way the events cho-
sen relate to the march are crucial factors in conveying bias. Townhall’s bias against
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the March of Science expressed in the argument that it politicizes science cannot be
traced back to negative opinion words; it relies on a comparison between the March for
Science and the Women’s March, which is portrayed as a political, anti-Trump event.
Newsbusters takes a different track: the opening paragraph conveys an overall negative
perspective on theMarch for Science, despite its neutral language, but it achieves this by
contrasting general interest in the march with a claimed negative view of the march by
many “actual scientists.” On the other hand, the New York Times points to an important
and presumably positive outcome of the march, despite its controversiality: a renewed
look into the role of science in public life and politics. LikeNewsbusters, it lacks any ex-
plicit evaluative language and relies on the structural relations between events to convey
an overall positive perspective; it contrasts the controversy surrounding the march with
a claim that the march has triggered an important discussion, which is in turn buttressed
by the reporter’s mentioning of the responses of the Times’ readership.
A formally precise account of interpretive bias will thus require an analysis of
histories and their structure and to this end, we exploit Segmented Discourse Repre-
sentation Theory or SDRT [3,4]. As the most precise and well-studied formal model
of discourse structure and interpretation to date, SDRT enables us to characterize and
to compare histories in terms of their structure and content. But neither SDRT nor any
other, extant theoretical or computational approach to discourse interpretation can ade-
quately deal with the inherent subjectivity and interest relativity of interpretation, which
our study of bias will illuminate. Message Exchange (ME) Games, a theory of games
that builds on SDRT, supplements SDRT with an analysis of the purposes and assump-
tions that figure in bias.While epistemic game theory in principle can supply an analysis
of these assumptions, it lacks linguistic constraints and fails to reflect the basic structure
of conversations [8]. ME games will enable us not only to model the purposes and as-
sumptions behind histories but also to evaluate their complexity and feasibility in terms
of the existence of winning strategies.4
Bias has been studied in cognitive psychology and empirical economics
[55,58,56,57,26,36,37,35,64]. Since the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky and
the economist Allais, psychologists and empirical economists have provided valuable
insights into cognitive biases in simple decision problems and simple mathematical
tasks [12]. Some of this work, for example the bias of framing effects [58], is directly
relevant to our theory of interpretive bias. A situation is presented using certain lexical
choices that lead to different “frames”: x% of the people will live if you do z (frame
1) versus y% of the people will die if you do z (frame 2). In fact, x+ y = 100, the to-
tal population in question; so the two consequents of the conditionals are equivalent.
Each frame elaborates or “colors” z in a way that affects an interpreter’s evaluation of
z. These frames are in effect short histories whose discourse structure explains their
coloring effect. Psychologists, empirical economists and statisticians have also investi-
gated cases of cognitive bias in which subjects deviate from prescriptively rational or
independently given objective outcomes in quantitative decision making and frequency
estimation, even though they arguably have the goal of seeking an optimal or “true”
4 The mathematical structure of ME games also makes it natural to investigate how ME game
analyses of bias interact with information-theoretic analyses proposed by [35] as a unifying
factor of cognitive biases studied in psychology.
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solution. In a general analysis of interpretive bias like ours, however, it is an open ques-
tion whether there is an objective norm or not, whether it is attainable and, if so, under
what conditions, and whether an agent builds a history for attaining that norm or for
some other purpose.
1.3 Organization of the paper
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model of interpretive bias.
Section 3 looks forward towards some consequences of our model for learning and
interpretation. We then draw some conclusions in Section 4. A detailed and formal
analysis of interpretive bias has important social implications. Questions of bias are not
only timely but also pressing for democracies that are having a difficult time dealing
with campaigns of disinformation and a society whose information sources are increas-
ingly fragmented and whose biases are often concealed. Understanding linguistic and
cognitive mechanisms for bias precisely and algorithmically can yield valuable tools
for navigating in an informationally bewildering world.
2 The model of interpretive bias
As mentioned in Section 1, understanding interpretive bias requires two ingredients.
First, we need to know what it is to interpret a text or to build a history over a set of
facts. Our answer comes from analyzing discourse structure and interpretation in SDRT
[3,4]. A history for a text connects its elementary information units, units that convey
propositions or describe events, using semantic relations that we call discourse relations
to construct a coherent and connected whole. Among such relations are logical, causal,
evidential, sequential and resemblance relations as well as relations that link one unit
with an elaboration of its content. It has been shown in the literature that discourse
structure is an important factor in accurately extracting sentiments and opinions from
text [21,23,22], and our examples show that this is the case for interpretive bias as well.
2.1 Epistemic ME games
The second ingredient needed to understand interpretive bias is the connection between
on the one hand the purpose and assumption behind telling a story and on the other the
particular way in which that story is told. A history puts the entities to be understood
into a structure that serves certain purposes or conversational goals [32]. Sometimes
the history attempts to get at the “truth”, the true causal and taxonomic structure of
a set of events. But a history may also serve other purposes—e.g., to persuade, or to
dupe an audience. Over the past five years, [8,6,?,2] have developed an account of con-
versational purposes or goals and how they guide strategic reasoning in a framework
calledMessage Exchange (ME) Games. ME games provide a general and formally pre-
cise framework for not only the analysis of conversational purposes and conversational
strategies, but also for the typology of dialogue games from [62] and finally for the
analysis of strategies for achieving what we would intuitively call “unbiased interpre-
tation”, as we shall see in the next section. In fact in ME Games, conversational goals
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are analyzed as properties, and hence sets, of conversations; these are the conversations
that “go well” for the player. ME games bring together the linguistic analysis of SDRT
with a game theoretic approach to strategic reasoning; in an ME game, players alternate
making sequences of discourse moves such as those described in SDRT, and a player
wins if the conversation constructed belongs to her winning condition, which is a subset
of the set of all possible conversational plays. ME games are designed to analyze the in-
teraction between conversational structure, purposes and assumptions, in the absence of
assumptions about cooperativity or other cognitive hypotheses, which can cause prob-
lems of interpretability in other frameworks [59]. ME games also assume a Jury that
sets the winning conditions and thus evaluates whether the conversational moves made
by players or conversationalists are successful or not. The Jury can be one or both of
the players themselves or some exogenous body.
To define an ME game, we first fix a finite set of players N and let i range over
N. For simplicity, we consider here the case where there are only two players, that is
N = {0,1}, but the notions can be easily lifted to the case where there are more than two
players. Here, Player (1− i)will denote the opponent of Player i. We need a vocabulary
V of moves or actions; these are the discourse moves as defined by the language of
SDRT. The intuitive idea behind an ME game is that a conversation proceeds in turns
where in each turn one of the players ‘speaks’ or plays a string of elements from V . In
addition, in the case of conversations, it is essential to keep track of “who says what”.
To model this, each player i was assigned a copyVi of the vocabularyV which is simply
given as Vi = V ×{i}. As [8] argues, a conversation may proceed indefinitely, and so
conversations correspond to plays of ME games, typically denoted as ρ, which are the
union of finite or infinite sequences in (V0∪V1), denoted as (V0∪V1)
∗ and (V0∪V1)
ω
respectively. The set of all possible conversations is thus ((V0 ∪V1)
∗∪ (V0 ∪V1)
ω) and
is denoted as (V0∪V1)
∞.
Definition 1 (ME game [8]). A Message Exchange game (ME game), G , is a tuple
((V0∪V1)
∞,J ) where J is a Jury.
Due to the ambiguities in language, discourse moves in SDRT are underspecified for-
mulas that may yield more than one fully specified discourse structure or histories for
the conversation; a resulting play in an ME game thus forms one or more histories or
complete discourse structures for the entire conversation.
To make ME games into a truly realistic model of conversation requires taking
account of the limited information available to conversational participants. [7] imported
the notion of a type space from epistemic game theory [33] to take account of this. The
type of a player i or the Jury is an abstract object that is used to code-up anything
and everything about i or the Jury, including her behavior, the way she strategizes, her
personal biases, etc. [33]. Let Si denote the set of strategies for Player i in an ME game;
let S= S0× S1; and let S
ρ
i be the set of strategies of i given play ρ.
Definition 2 (Harsanyi type space [33]). A Harsanyi type space for S is a tuple T =
({Ti}i∈{0,1},TJ ,{βˆ
ρ
i }i∈{0,1},ρ∈P ,{βˆ
ρ
J}ρ∈P ,S) such that TJ and Ti, for each i, are non-
empty (at-most countable) sets called the Jury-types and i-types respectively and {βˆ
ρ
i }
and {βˆ
ρ
J } are the beliefs of Player i and the Jury respectively at play ρ ∈ P .
[7] defines the beliefs of the players and Jury using the following functions.
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Definition 3 (Belief function). For every play ρ∈ P the (first order) belief βˆρi of player
i at ρ is a pair of measurable functions βˆ
ρ
i = (β
ρ
i ,ξ
ρ
i ) where β
ρ
i is the belief function and
ξ
ρ
i is the interpretation function defined as:
β
ρ
i : Ti×h(ρ)→ ∆(T(1−i)× S
ρ
(1−i)×TJ )
ξ
ρ
i : Ti×T(1−i)×TJ → ∆(h(ρ))
where ∆(·) is the set of probability distributions over the corresponding set. Simi-
larly the (first order) belief βˆ
ρ
J of the Jury is a pair of measurable functions βˆ
ρ
J =(β
ρ
J ,ξ
ρ
J )
where the belief function β
ρ
i and the interpretation function ξ
ρ
i are defined as:
β
ρ
J : TJ ×h(ρ)→ ∆(T0× S
ρ
0×T1× S
ρ
1)
ξ
ρ
J : TJ ×T0×T1 → ∆(h(ρ))
Composing β and ξ together over their respective outputs reveals a correspondence
between interpretations of plays and types for a fixed Jury type τ: every history yields
a distribution over types for the players and every tuple of types for the players and the
Jury fixes a distribution over histories. We’ll call this the types/history correspondence.
An epistemic ME game is an ME game with a Harsanyi type space and a
type/history correspondence as we’ve defined it. By adding types to an ME game, we
provide the beginnings of a game theoretic model of interpretive bias that we believe is
completely new. Our definition of bias is now:
Definition 4 (Interpretive Bias). An interpretive bias in an epistemic ME game is the
probability distribution over types given by the belief function of the conversationalists
or players, or the Jury.
Note that in an ME game there are typically several interpretive biases at work: each
player has her own bias, as does the Jury.
Outside of language, statisticians study bias; and sample bias is currently an im-
portant topic.5 To do so, they exploit statistical models with a set of parameters and
random variables, which play the role of our types in interpretive bias. But for us, the
interpretive process is already well underway once the model, with its constraints, fea-
tures and explanatory hypotheses, is posited; at least a partial history, or set of histories,
has already been created.
The ME model in [7] not only makes histories dependent on biases but also condi-
tionally updates an agent’s bias, the probability distribution, given the interpretation of
the conversation or more generally a course of events as it has so far unfolded and cru-
cially as the agent has so far interpreted it. This means that certain biases are reinforced
as a history develops, and in turn strengthen the probability of histories generated by
such biases in virtue of the types/histories correspondence. We now turn to an analysis
of (2) discussed in [8,7] where arguably this happens.
5 See https://www.elen.ucl.ac.be/esann/index.php?pg=specsess#biasesbigdata.
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2.2 Analyzing the Sheehan example
To formulate (2) as an ME game, [7] assumes two active players (i) the reporter corps
(R) and (ii) spokesman Sheehan (S). The play in is given in (2).
We assume our players commit to the unambiguous contents of their discourse
moves. To elucidate this assumption, we note first that there are many relevant pa-
rameters to determining discourse structure—for instance, the various features used by
discourse parsing models [49], whose probability of supporting a particular discourse
structure for a text is learned from a corpus. But for now we assume that this informa-
tion, when it is encoded in the lexicon or the grammar, is common knowledge and part
of a speaker’s competence.
But in (2) there are also moves with an ambiguous or underspecified content, and
those are the turns on which Sheehan uses the phrase, the Senator has reported every
gift he has ever received. There are choices as to what the discourse function of that
phrase is—e.g., is Sheehan answering the reporter’s question for instance or evading
it? So we need to make a distinction between an underspecified logical form for the
dialogue or ULF [4] and a full history, as explained in [7]. Let’s call the underspecified
play of explicit commitments for (2) ρ.
To analyze (2) [7] assumes two types for Sheehan that are relevant to interpreting
what he said: tH and tD.
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– tH is the ‘honest’ type, according to which Sheehan truly implicates that the Senator
did not receive the suits and that he simply does not want to respond to this charge.
– tD is the ‘dishonest’ type, according to which Coleman received the suits but did
not declare them and Sheehan is trying to cover this fact up.
[7] also envisages two types for the Jury: tjU and tjB.
– tjU is the ‘unbiased’ Jury that starts out with a presumption of full disclosure and
honesty from Sheehan but reserves judgment about whether the Senator received
the suits.
– tjB is the type of the Jury that is disposed to believe in Sheehan’s confirmation of
the Senator’s innocence. Such a Jury is ‘biased’, in virtue of its prior beliefs that
dispose it to interpret Sheehan’s moves, regardless of what they are, in a favorable
light.
These two types influence how the underspecified elements in ρ are interpreted. In
particular, two different interpretations of the underspecified elements give rise to two
different histories, as detailed in [7]. The types tjU and tjB of the Jury have different
priors concerning S’s types and this is what drives their differing interpretations. tjU
starts with an indifference between tH and tD, while tjB starts off believing S is of
type tH , with a high probability. [7] gives a detailed analysis of how the two different
interpretations come about from different beliefs. But in addition, it shows how these
interpretations change the beliefs of the two Juries about the honesty of Sheehan; guided
by its interpretation of ρ and using Bayesian conditionalization, tjU comes eventually
to believe that Sheehan is of type tD, while tjB uses the same techniques but crucially a
different interpretation to reinforce its belief that Sheehan is of type tH .
6 These two types to illustrate how types can affect interpretation. In reality, there might be many
more.
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2.3 Generalizing from the case study
The Sheehan case study in [7] shows the interactions of interpretation and probability
distributions over types. We’ll refer to content that exploit assumptions about types’
epistemic content. (2) also offers a case of a self-confirming bias with Jury tjB.
7 But the
analysis proposed by [7] leaves open an important open question about what types are
relevant to constructing a particular history and only examines one out of many other
cases of biased interpretation. In epistemic gamemodels, the relevant types are typically
given exogenously and Harsanyi’s type space construction is silent on this question. The
question seems a priori very hard to answer, because anything and everything might be
relevant to constructing a history.
In (2), the relevant types have to do with the interpreters’ or Jurys’ attitudes
towards the commitments of the spokesman and Coleman. These attitudes might
reinforce or be a product of other beliefs like beliefs about the spokesman’s political
affiliations. But we will put forward the following simplifying hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: epistemic content is based on assumptions about types defined by
different attitudes to commitments by the players and or the Jury to the contents of a
discourse move or sequence of discourse moves.
Hypothesis 2: These assumptions can be represented as probability distributions over
types.
In (2), we’ve only looked at epistemic content from the point of view of the interpreter,
which involves types for the Jury defined in terms of probability distributions over types
for the speaker. But we can look at subjective interpretations from the perspective of
the speaker as well. In other words, we look at how the speaker might conceptualize
the discourse situation, in particular her audience. We illustrate this with another type
of content based on types. Consider the following move by Marion Le Pen, a leader of
the French nationalist, right-wing party le Front National in which she recently said:
(3) La France e´tait la fille aıˆne´e de l’e´glise. Elle est en passe de devenir la petite
nie`ce de l’Islam. (France was once the eldest daughter of the Catholic church. It
is now becoming the little niece of Islam.)8
(3) appeals to what the speaker takes to be her intended audience’s beliefs about Islam,
Catholicism and France. In virtue of these beliefs, this discourse move takes on a loaded
racist meaning, conveying an assault on France and its once proud status by people of
North African descent. Without those background beliefs, however, Le Pen’s statement
might merely be considered a somewhat curious description of a recent shift in religious
7 Self-reinforcing biases of nonlinguistic facts are also echoed in popular analyses, for instance
‘The Evangelical Roots of Our Post-Truth Society’ by Molly Worthen, New York Times,
16.04.2017. But as far as we know, only [7] has provided at least a partial formal analysis
of this phenomenon.
8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9r8fKymWWZ8
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majorities. This is known as a “dog whistle,” in which a discourse move communicates
a content other than its grammatically determined content to a particular audience [34].
While [54] proposes that such messages are conventional implicatures, [34,40] show
that dog whistle content doesn’t behave like other conventional implicatures; in terms
of tests about “at issue content”, dog whistle content patterns with other at issue content,
not with the content associated with conventional implicatures in the sense of [51]. This
also holds of content that resolves ambiguities as in (2).
The dogwhistle content seems to be driven by the hearer’s type in (3) or the
speaker’s beliefs about the interpreter’s or hearer’s type. Generalizing from [19], the
use of the historical expression la fille aine´e de l’e´glise contrasted with la petite nie`ce
has come to encode a type, in much the same way that dropping the final g in present
participles and gerunds has come to signify a type [19], for the speaker i about hearer j;
e.g., j will believe that i has the strategy of using just this language to access the loaded
interpretation and moreover will identify with its content. Because this meaning comes
about in virtue of the hearer’s type, the speaker is in a position to plausibly deny that
they committed to conveying a racist meaning, which is a feature of such dog whistles.9
In fact, we might say that all dogwhistle content is so determined.
We can complicate the analysis by considering the speaker’s types, the interlocu-
tor’s types and types for the Jury when these three components of an ME game are
distinct (i.e. the Jury is distinct from the interlocutors). A case like this is the Bronston
example discussed in [7].
By looking at dogwhistles, we’ve now distinguished two kinds of epistemic con-
tent that depends on an interpreters’ type. The epistemic content may as in (2) fill out
the meaning of an underspecified play to produce a determinate history.10 Dog whistles
add content to a specific discourse unit that goes beyond its grammatically determined
meaning.11 More formally, we can define these two kinds of epistemic content using the
machinery of ME games. Given that plays in an ME game are sequences of discourse
moves, we can appeal to the semantics of these moves and a background consequence
relation |= defined as usual. In addition, a play ρ in an ME game may itself be a fully
specified history or a sequence of discourse moves that is compatible with several fully
specified histories given a particular interpreter’s or Jury’s type J. Let h(ρ)J be the set of
histories (FLFs) compatible with a play ρ given an interpreter or Jury type J. ρ will be
ambiguous and open to epistemic content supplementation just in case: (i) |h(ρ)|J > 1
for any type J for a linguistically competent jury, and (ii) there are h1,h2 ∈ h(ρ)J , such
that h1 and h2 are semantically distinct (neither one entails the other). Now suppose that
a play ρ gives rise through the grammar to a history, h∗ρ. Then ρ is a dog whistle for J
9 [34] appeal to an epistemic signaling game approach like that of [19] to talk about commu-
nicating that a speaker is of a certain type and believes that the interpreter is of that type too.
However, the types in [19] have to do with politeness registers, not generalized beliefs about
interpretation.
10 Note that this is a precise epistemic game-theoretic model of what [52], for example, called
”pragmatic saturation.” However, in following the ideas of [19], we should rather call this
“sociolinguistic saturation.”
11 This in turn is a precise model of what called relevance theorists like [53] have called ”free
enrichment.”
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just in case: (i) |h(ρ)|J > 1, (ii) h
∗
ρ ∈ h(ρ) and (iii) there is a h
†
ρ ∈ h(ρ)J that can posi-
tively affect some jury perhaps distinct from J and such that h
†
ρ |= h
∗
ρ. On this definition,
a player who utters such a play ρ always has the excuse that what he/she actually meant
was h∗ρ when challenged—which seems to be one essential feature of a dog whistle.
Plays with such semantic features may not be a pervasive feature of conversation;
not every element is underspecified or is given a content over and above its linguistically
determined one. But in interpreting a set of nonlinguistic facts X or data not already
connected together in a history, that is in constructing a history over X , an interpreter
i, who in this case is a speaker or writer, must appeal to her beliefs, which includes
her beliefs about the Jury to whom her discourse actions are directed. So certainly the
type of i, which includes beliefs about the Jury for the text, is relevant to what history
emerges. The facts in X don’t wear their relational properties to other facts on their
sleeves so to speak, and so i has to supply the connections to construct the history. In
effect for a set of non linguistically given facts, “ambiguities of attachment,” whose
specification determines how the facts in X are related to each other, are ubiquitous
and must be resolved in constructing a history. The speaker or “history creator” i’s
background beliefs determine the play and the history an interpreter j takes away.
In the case of constructing a history over a set of nonlinguistic facts X , the inter-
preter j’s task of getting the history i has constructed will not reliably succeed unless
one of two conditions are met: either i and j just happen to share the relevant beliefs
(have close enough types) so that they construct the same histories from X , or i uses
linguistic devices to signal the history.12 ME games require winning conversations, and
by extension texts, to be (mostly) coherent, which means that the discourse connections
between the elements in the history must be largely determined in any successful play,
or can be effectively determined by j. This means that i will usually reveal relevant
information about her type through her play, in virtue of the type/history correspon-
dence, enough to reconstruct the history or much of it. In the stories on the March for
Science, for example, the reporters evoke very different connections between the march
and other facts. The Townhall reporter, for instance, connects the March for Science to
the Women’s march and “leftwing” political manifestations and manifests a negative
attitude toward the March. But he does so so unambiguously that little subjective in-
terpretation on the part of the interpreter or Jury is needed to construct the history or
assign a high probability to a type for i that drives the story.
This discussion leads to the following observations. To construct a history over a
set of disconnected nonlinguistic facts X , in general a Jury needs to exploit linguistic
12 the space of possibilities is too vast for j to converge on a determinate history representing the
commitments of the speaker i with any confidence, if X has any complexity and i doesn’t give
any hint about the history she commits to over X . ME games require that the relevant types for
the interpretation of a conversation affect conversational strategies and the winning conditions
of the players. By itself, however, our assumption doesn’t delimit the set of relevant types to a
manageable set. The set of all possible winning conditions and strategies is much larger than
what a Harsanyi type space for an ME game allows; recall, it allows an at most countable set
of types for each player and the Jury, but the space of all conversations has cardinality ℵ1,
so using the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis the set of all possible winning conditions has
cardinality ℵ2.
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pointers to the connections between elements of X , if the speaker is to achieve the goal
of imparting a (discourse) coherent story, unless the speaker knows that the Jury or
interpreter has detailed knowledge of her type. The speaker may choose to leave cer-
tain elements underspecified or ambiguous, or use a specified construction, to invoke
epistemic content for a particular type that she is confident the Jury instantiates. How
much so depends on her confidence in the type of the Jury. This distribution or con-
fidence level opens a panoply of options about the uses of epistemic content: at one
end there are histories constructed from linguistic cues with standard, grammatically
encoded meanings; at the other end there are histories generated by a code shared with
only a few people whose types are mutually known. As the conversation proceeds as
we have seen, probabilities about types are updated and so the model should predict
that a speaker may resort to more code-like messages in the face of feedback confirm-
ing her hypotheses about the Jury’s type (if such feedback can be given) and that the
speaker may revert to a more message exploiting grammatical cues in the face of feed-
back disconfirming her hypotheses about the Jury’s type. Thus, the epistemicMEmodel
predicts a possible change in register as the speaker receives more information about
the Jury’s type, though this change is subject to other conversational goals coded in the
speaker’s victory condition for the ME game.
2.4 ME persuasion games
We’ve now seen how histories in ME games bring an interpretive bias, the bias of the
history’s creator, to the understanding of a certain set of facts. We’ve also seen how
epistemicME games allow for the introduction of epistemic content in the interpretation
of plays. Each such epistemic interpretation is an instance of a bias that goes beyond
the grammatically determined meaning of the play and is dependent upon the Jury’s or
interpreter’s type. We now make explicit another crucial component of ME games and
their relation to bias: the players’ winning conditions or discourse goals. Why is this
relevant to a study of bias? The short answer is that players’ goals tells us whether two
players’ biases on a certain subject are compatible or resolvable or not. Imagine that
our two Juries in (2) shared the same goal—of getting at the truth behind the Senator’s
refusal to comment about the suits. They might still have come up with the opposing
interpretations that they did in our discussion above. But they could have discussed
their differences, and eventually would have come to agreement, as we show below in
Proposition 1.13
However, our two Juries might have different purposes too. One Jury might have
the purpose of finding out about the suits, like the reporters; the other might have the
purpose just to see Senator Coleman defended, a potentially quite different winning
condition and collection of histories. In so doing we would identify Jury 1 with the
reporters or at least Rachel, and Jury 2 with Sheehan. Such different discourse pur-
poses have to be taken into account in attempting to make a distinction between good
and bad biases. From the perspective of subjective rationality or rationalizability (an
important criterion in epistemic game theory [13]), good biases for a particular con-
13 Note that our result extends the famous result of [10], as we are not assuming common priors,
but only a rational process of belief revision in the face of evidence.
13
versation should be those that lead to histories in the winning condition, histories that
fulfill the discourse purpose; bad biases lead to histories that do not achieve the winning
condition. The goals that a Jury or interpreter j adopts and her biases go together; j’s
interpretive bias is good for speaker i, if it helps i achieve her winning condition. Hence,
i’s beliefs about j are crucial to her success and rationalizable behavior. Based on those
beliefs i’s behavior is rationalizable in the sense we have just discussed. If she believes
Jury 2 is the one whose winning condition she should satisfy, there is no reason for her
to change that behavior. Furthermore, suppose Jury 1 and Jury 2 discuss their evalua-
tions; given that they have different goals, there is no reason for them to come to an
agreement with the other’s point of view either. Both interpretations are rationalizable
as well, if the respective Juries have the goals they do above. A similar story applies to
constructing histories over a set of facts, in so far as they had different conceptions of
winning conditions set by their respective Juries. In contrast to Aumann’s dictum [10],
in our scenario there is every reason to agree to disagree!14
Understanding such discourse goals is crucial to understanding bias for at least two
reasons. The first is that together with the types that are conventionally coded in dis-
course moves, they fix the space of relevant types. In (2), Jury 1 is sensitive to a winning
condition in which the truth about the suits is revealed, what we call a truth oriented
goal. The goal of Jury 2, on the other hand, is to see that Coleman is successfully de-
fended, what we call a persuasion goal. In fact, we show below that a truth oriented
goal is a kind of persuasion goal. Crucial to the accomplishment of either of these goals
is for the Jury j to decide whether the speaker i is committing to a definite answer that
she will defend (or better yet an answer that she believes) on a given move to a question
from her interlocutor or is i trying to avoid any such commitments. If it’s the latter, then
j would be epistemically rash to be persuaded. But the two possibilities are just the two
types for Sheehan that are relevant to the interpretation of the ambiguous moves in (2).
Because persuasive goals are almost ubiquitous at least as parts of speaker goals, not
only in conversation but also for texts (think of how the reporters in the examples on
the March for Science are seeking to convince us of a particular view of the event), we
claim that these two types are relevant to the interpretation of many, if not all, conver-
sations. In general we conjecture that the relevant types for interpretation may all rely
on epistemic requirements for meeting various kinds of conversational goals.
The second reason that discourse goals are key to understanding bias is that by
analyzing persuasion goals in more detail we get to the heart of what bias is. Imagine
a kind of ME game played between two players, E(loı¨se) and A(belard), where E pro-
poses and tries to defend a particular interpretation of some set of facts X , and A tries
to show the interpretation is incorrect, misguided, based on prejudice or whatever will
convince the Jury to be dissuaded from adopting E’s interpretation of X . As in all ME
games, E’s victory condition in an ME persuasion game is a set of histories determined
by the Jury, but but it crucially depends on E’s and A’s beliefs about the Jury: E has
to provide a history h over X ; A has to attack that history in ways that accord with her
14 Technically, Aumann’s observation relies on common prior probabilities. We don’t see any
reason to adopt such an assumption in an analysis of strategic conversations or bias. Our ob-
servation is sort of a correlate or converse of Aumann’s.
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beliefs about the Jury; and E has to defend h in ways that will, given her beliefs, dispose
the Jury favorably to it.
An ME persuasion game is one where E and A each present elements of X and
may also make argumentative or attack moves in their conversation. At each turn of
the game, A can argue about the history constructed by E over the facts given so far,
challenge it with new facts or attack its assumptions, with the result that E may rethink
and redo portions her history over X (though not abandon the original history entirely)
in order to render A’s attack moot. E wins if the history she finally settles on for the
facts in X allows her to rebut every attack by A; A wins otherwise.
A reasonable precisification of this victory condition is that the proportions of good
unanswered attacks on the latest version of E’s history with respect to the total number
of attacks at some point continues to diminish and eventually goes to 0. This is a sort of
limit condition: if we think of the initial segments n E’s play as producing an “initial”
history hEn over X , as n→ ∞, h
E
n has no unanswered counterattacks by A that affect the
Jury. Such winning histories are extremely difficult to construct; as one can see from
inspection, no finite segment of an infinite play guarantees such a winning condition.15
We shall call a history segment that is part of a history in E’s winning condition as we
have just characterized it, E-defensible.
The notion of an ME persuasion game opens the door to a study of attacks, a study
that can draw on work in argumentation and game theory [25,29,15]. ME games and
ME persuasion games in particular go beyond the work just cited, however, because
our notion of an effective attack involves the type of the Jury as a crucial parameter;
the effectiveness of an attack for a Jury relies on its prejudices, technically its priors
about the game’s players’ types (and hence their beliefs and motives). For instance,
an uncovering of an agent’s racist bias when confronted with a dog whistle like that
in (3) is an effective attack technique if the respondent’s type for the Jury is such that
it is sensitive to such accusations, while it will fail if the Jury is insensitive to such
accusations. ME games make plain the importance in a persuasion game of accurately
gauging the beliefs of the Jury!
2.5 ME truth games
We now turn to a special kind of ME persuasion game with what we call a disinter-
ested Jury. The intuition behind a disinterested Jury is simple: such a Jury judges the
persuasion game based only on the public commitments that follow from the discourse
moves that the players make. It is not predisposed to either player in the game. While
it is difficult to define such a disinterested Jury in terms of its credences, its probability
distribution over types, we can establish some necessary conditions. We first define the
notion of the dual of a play of an ME game. Let (v, i) ∈ (V0∪V1)
ω be an element of the
labeled vocabulary with player i ∈ {0,1}. Define its dual as:
(v, i) = (v,1− i)
15 The complexity of this winning condition can be characterized using the mathematical struc-
ture of an ME game, in which winning conditions can be characterized in terms of the Borel
hierarchy. For details see [8].
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The dual of a play ρ ∈ ((V0∪V1)
ω)∞ then is simply the lifting of this operator over the
entire sequence of ρ. That is, if ρ = x0x1x2 . . ., where x0 = ε then
ρ = x0x1 x2 . . .
Then, a disinterested Jury must necessarily satisfy:
– Indifference towards player identity: A Jury J = (Win0,Win1) is unbiased only
if for every ρ ∈ (V0∪V1)
ω, ρ ∈Wini iff ρ ∈Win(1−i).
– Symmetry of prior belief: A Jury is unbiased only if it has symmetrical prior
beliefs about the player types.
Clearly, the Jury tjB does not have symmetrical prior beliefs nor is it indifferent to player
identity, while Jury tjU arguably has symmetrical beliefs about the participants in (2).
Note also that while Symmetry of prior beliefs is satisfied by a uniform distribution
over all types, but it does not entail such a uniform distribution. Symmetry is closely
related to the principle of maximum entropy used in fields as diverse as physics and
computational linguistics[14], according to which in the absence of any information
about the players would entail a uniform probability distribution over types.
A distinterested Jury should evaluate a conversation based solely on the strength
of the points put forth by the participants. But also crucially it should evaluate the con-
versation in light of the right points. So for instance, appeals to ad hominem attacks
by A or colorful insults should not sway the Jury in favor of A. They should evaluate
only based on how the points brought forward affect their credences under conditional-
ization. A distinterested Jury is impressed only by certain attacks from A, ones based
on evidence (E’s claims aren’t supported by the facts) and on formal properties of co-
herence, consistency and explanatory or predictive power. In such a game it is common
knowledge that attacks based on information about E’s type that is not relevant either
to the evidential support or formal properties of her history are ignored by the Jury and
the participants know this. The same goes for E; counterattacks by her on A that are not
based on evidence or the formal properties mentioned above.
[8] discusses the formal properties of coherence and consistency in detail, and we
say more about explanatory and predictive power below. The evidential criterion, how-
ever, is also particularly important, and it is one that a disinterested Jury must attend to.
Luckily for us, formal epistemologists have formulated constraints like cognitive skill
and safety or anti-luck on beliefs that are relevant to characterizing this evidential crite-
rion [48,41]. Cognitive skill is a factor that affects the success (accuracy) of an agent’s
beliefs: the success of an agent’s beliefs is the result of her cognitive skill, exactly to
the extent that the reasoning process that produces them makes evidential factors (how
weighty, specific, misleading, etc., the agent’s evidence is) comparatively important for
explaining that success, and makes non-evidential factors comparatively unimportant.
In addition, we will require that the relevant evidential factors are those that have been
demonstrated to be effective in the relevant areas of inquiry. So if a Jury measures the
success of a persuasion game in virtue of a criterion of cognitive ability on the part
of the participants and this is common knowledge among the participants (something
we will assume throughout here), then, for instance, A’s attacks have to be about the
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particular evidence adduced to support E’s history, the way it was collected or verifi-
able errors in measurements etc., and preclude general skeptical claims from credible
attacks in such a game. These epistemic components thus engender more relevant types
for interpretation: are the players using cognitive skill and anti-luck conditions or not?
More particularly, most climate skeptics’ attacks on climate change science, using gen-
eral doubts about the evidence without using any credible scientific criteria attacking
specific evidential bases, would consequently be ruled as irrelevant in virtue of a prop-
erty like cognitive skill. But this criterion may also affect the Jury’s interpretation of the
conversation. A Jury whose beliefs are constrained by cognitive ability will adjust its
beliefs about player types and about interpretation only in the light of relevant evidential
factors.
Safety is a feature of beliefs that says that conditionalizing on circumstances
that could have been otherwise without one’s evidence changing should not affect the
strength of one’s beliefs. Safety rules out out belief profiles in which luck or mere
hunches play a role.
The notion of a disinterested jury is formally a complicated one. Consider an in-
terpretation of a conversation between two players E and A. Bias can be understood as
a sort of modal operator over an agent’s first order and higher order beliefs. So a disin-
terested Jury in an ME game means that neither its beliefs about A nor about E involve
an interested bias; nor do its beliefs about A’s beliefs about E’s beliefs or E’s beliefs
about the A’s beliefs about E’s beliefs, and so on up the epistemic hierarchy. Thus, a
disinterested Jury in this setting involves an infinitary conjunction of modal statements,
which is intuitively (and mathematically) a complex condition on beliefs. And since
this disinterestedness must be common knowledge amongst the players, E and A have
equally complex beliefs.
We are interested in ME persuasion games in which the truth may emerge. Is an
ME persuasion game with a disinterested Jury sufficient to ensure such an outcome?
No. there may be a fatal flaw in E’s history that A does not uncover and that the Jury
does not see. We have to suppose certain abilities on the part of A and/or the Jury—
namely, that if E has covered up some evidence or falsely constructed evidence or has
introduced an inconsistency in her history, that eventually A will uncover it. Further,
if there is an unexplained leap, an incoherence in the history, then A will eventually
find it. Endowing A with such capacities would suffice to ensure a history that is in E’s
winning condition to be the best possible approximation to the truth, a sort of Peircean
ideal. Even if we assume only that A is a competent and skilled practitioner of her art,
we have something like a good approximation of the truth for any history in E’s winning
condition. We call a persuasion game with such a disinterested Jury and such a winning
condition for E anME truth game.
In an ME truth game, a player or a Jury may not be completely disinterested be-
cause of skewed priors. But she may still be interested in finding out the truth and thus
adjusting her priors in the face of evidence. We put some constraints on the revision
of beliefs of a truth interested player. Suppose such a player i has a prior Pri on a16
such that Pri(a) > 1/2, but in a play ρ of an ME truth game it is revealed that i has
no confirming evidence for a that the opponent 1− i cannot attack without convincing
16 a may be a fact, a history, a type etc. The exact nature of a is not important for the argument.
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rebuttal. Then a truth interested player i should update her beliefs Priρ after ρ so that
Priρ(a) = Pr
i(a|ρ)≤ 1/2. On the other hand, if i cannot rebut the confirming evidence
that 1− i has for ¬a, then Priρ(a) = Pr
i(a|ρ) = 0. Where ρ is infinite, we put a con-
dition on the prefixes ρn of ρ: Pr
i(a|ρ) = liminfn→∞ Pr
i(a|ρn). Given our concepts of
truth interested players and an ME truth game, we can show the following.
Proposition 1. If the two players of a 2 history ME truth game G, have access to all
the facts in X , and are truth interested but have incompatible histories for X based on
distinct priors, they will eventually agree to a common history for X .
To prove this, we note that our players will note the disagreement and try to overcome
it since they have a common interest, in the truth about X . Then it suffices to look at
two cases: in case one, one player i converges to the 1− i’s beliefs in the ME game
because 1− i successfully attacks the grounds on which i’s incompatible interpretation
is based; in case two, neither i nor 1− i is revealed to have good evidential grounds for
their conflicting beliefs and so they converge to common revised beliefs that assign an
equal probability to the prior beliefs that were in conflict. Note that the difference with
[10] is that we need to assume that players interested in the truth conditionalize upon
outcomes of discussion in an ME game in the same way. Players who do not do this
need not ever agree.
There are interesting variants of an ME truth game where one has to do with ap-
proximations. ME truth games are infinitary games, in which getting a winning history
is something E may or may not achieve in the limit. But typically we want the right, or
“good enough” interpretation sooner rather than later. We can also appeal to discounted
ME games developed in [2], in which the scores are assigned to individual discourse
moves in context which diminish as the game progresses, to investigate cases where
getting things right, or right enough, early on in an ME truth game is crucial.
In another variant of an ME truth game, which we call a 2-history ME truth game,
we pit two biases one for E and one for A, and the two competing histories they en-
gender, about a set of facts against each other. Note that such a game is not necessarily
win-lose as is the original ME truth game, because neither history the conversationalists
develop and defend may satisfy the disinterested Jury. That is, both E and A may lose in
such a game. Is it also possible that they both win? Can both E and A revise their histo-
ries so that their opponents have in the end no telling attacks against their histories? We
think not at least in the case where the histories make or entail contradictory claims: in
such a case they should both lose because they cannot defeat the opposing possibility.
Suppose E wants to win an ME truth game and to construct a truthful history.
Let’s assume that the set of facts X over which the history is constructed is finite. What
should she do? Is it possible for her to win? How hard is it for her to win? Does E have
a winning strategy? As an ME truth game is win-lose, if the winning condition is Borel
definable, it will be determined [8]; either E has a winning strategy or A does. Whether
E has a winning strategy or not is important: if she does, there is a method for finding
an optimal history in the winning set; if she doesn’t, an optimal history from the point
of view of a truth-seeking goal in the ME truth game is not always attainable.
To construct a history from ambiguous signals for a history over X , the interpreter
must rely on her beliefs about the situation and her interlocutors to estimate the right
history. So the question of getting at truthful interpretations of histories depends at least
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in part on the right answer to the question, what are the right beliefs about the situation
and the participants that should be invoked in interpretation? Given that beliefs are
probabilistic, the space of possible beliefs is vast. The right set of beliefs will typically
form a very small set with respect to the set of all possible beliefs about a typical
conversational setting. Assuming that one will be in such a position “by default” without
any further argumentation is highly implausible, as a simple measure theoretic argument
ensures that the set of possible interpretations are almost always biased away from a
winning history in an ME truth game.
What is needed for E-defensibility and a winning strategy in an ME truth game?
[8] argued that consistency and coherence (roughly, the elements of the history have to
be semantically connected in relevant ways [4]) are necessary conditions on all win-
ning conditions and would thus apply to such histories. A necessary additional property
is completeness, an accounting of all or sufficiently many of the facts the history is
claimed to cover. We’ve also mentioned the care that has to be paid to the evidence and
how it supports the history. Finally, it became apparent when we considered a variant
of an ME truth game in which two competing histories were pitted against each other
that a winning condition for each player is that they must be able to defeat the opposing
view or at least cast doubt on it.
More particularly, truth seeking biases should provide predictive and explanatory
power, which are difficult to define. But we offer the following encoding of predictive-
ness and explanatory power as constraints on continuations of a given history in an ME
truth game.
Definition 5 (Predictiveness). A history h developed in an ME game for a set of facts
X is predictive just in case when E is presented with a set of facts Y relevantly similar
to X , h implies a E-defensible extension h′ of h to all the facts in Y .
A similar definition can be given for the explanatory power of a history.
Does E have a strategy for constructing a truthful history that can guarantee all
of these things? Well, if the facts X it is supposed to relate are sufficiently simple or
sufficiently unambiguous in the sense that they determine just one history and E is
effectively able to build and defend such a history, then yes she does. So very simple
cases like establishing whether your daughter has a snack for after school in the morning
or not are easy to determine, and the history is equally simple, once you have the right
evidence: yes she has a snack, or no she doesn’t. A text which is unambiguous similarly
determines only one history, and linguistic competence should suffice to determine what
that history is. On the other hand, it is also possible that E may determine the right
history h from a play ρ when h depends on the type of the relevant players of ρ. For E
can have a true “type” for the players relevant to ρ. In general whether or not a player
has a winning strategy will depend on the structure of the optimal history targeted, as
well as on the resources and constraints on the players in an ME truth game.
In the more general case, however, whetherE has a winning strategy in anME truth
game become in general non trivial. At least in a relative sort of way, E can construct
a model satisfying her putative history at each stage to show consistency (relative to
ZF or some other background theory); coherence can be verified by inspection over the
finite discourse graph of the relevant history at each stage and ensuing attacks. Finally
completeness and evidential support can be guaranteed at each stage in the history’s
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construction, if E has the right sort of beliefs. If all this can be guaranteed at each
stage, von Neumann’s minimax theorem or its extension in [16] guarantees that E has a
winning strategy for E-defensibility.
In future work, we plan to analyze in detail some complicated examples like the
ongoing debate about climate, change where there is large scale scientific agreement
but where disagreement exists because of distinct winning conditions.
3 Looking ahead
An ME truth game suggests a certain notion of truth: the truth is a winning history in
an ME persuasion game with a disinterested Jury. This is a Peircean “best attainable”
approximation of the truth, an ”internal” notion of truth based on consistency, coher-
ence with the available evidence and explanatory and predictive power. But we could
investigate also a more external view of truth. Such a view would suppose that the Jury
has in its possession the “true history over a set of facts X , that the history eventually
constructed by E should converge to within a certain margin of error in the limit.17
We think ME games are a promising tool for investigating bias, and in this section
we mention some possible applications and open questions that ME games might help
us answer. ME truth games allow us to analyze extant strategies for eliminating bias.
For instance, given two histories for a given set of facts, it is a common opinion that one
finds a less biased history by splitting the difference between them.18 This is a strategy
perhaps distantly inspired by the idea that the truth lies in the golden mean between
extremes. But is this really true? ME games should allow us to encode this strategy and
find out.
Another connection that our approach can exploit is the one between games and
reinforcement learning [46,17,38]. While reinforcement learning is traditionally under-
stood as a problem involving a single agent and is not powerful enough to understand
the dynamics of competing biases of agents with different winning conditions, there is
a direct connection made in [17] between evolutionary games with replicator dynam-
ics and the stochastic learning theory of [20] with links to multiagent reinforcement
learning. [46,38] provide a foundation for multiagent reinforcement learning in stochas-
tic games. The connection between ME games and stochastic and evolutionary games
has not been explored but some victory conditions in ME games can be an objective
that a replicator dynamics converges to, and epistemic ME games already encompass
a stochastic component. Thus, our research will be able to draw on relevant results in
these areas.
17 To make this more precise, we need some measure of distance on histories [47,61,60]. Then,
assuming a distance measure d, let hEn and hn be the respective histories constructed over the
prefix of a play of length n. Letting c ≥ 0 be a margin of error or cost, E’s winning condition
is:
(i) limn→ω d(hn,h
E
n )≤ c
18 For instance see, http://www.edu.gov.mb.ca/k12/cur/socstud/foundation gr9/blms/9-1-3g.pdf.
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A typical assumption we make as scientists is that rationality would lead us to
always prefer to have a more complete and more accurate history for our world. But
bias isn’t so simple, as an analysis of ME games can show. ME games are played for
many purposes with non truth-seeking biases that lead to histories that are not a best
approximation to the truth may be the rational or optimal choice, if the winning condi-
tion in the game is other than that defined in an ME truth game. This has real political
and social relevance; for example, a plausible hypothesis is that those who argue that
climate change is a hoax are building an alternative history, not to get at the truth but
for other political purposes.
Even being a truth interested player can at least initially fail to generate histories
that are in the winning condition of an ME truth game. Suppose E, motivated by truth
interest, has constructed for facts X a history h that meets constraints including coher-
ence, consistency, and completeness, and it provides explanatory and predictive power
for at least a large subset Z of X . E’s conceptualization of X can still go wrong, and
E may fail to have a winning strategy in interesting ways. First, h can mischaracterize
X with high confidence in virtue of evidence only from Z [43];19 Especially if Z is
large and hence h is just simply very “long”, it is intuitively more difficult even for truth
seeking players to come to accept that an alternative history is the correct one. Second,
h may lack or be incompatible with concepts that would be needed to be aware of facts
in X \Z. [5,59] investigate a special case of this, a case of unawareness. To succeed E
would have to learn the requisite concepts first.
All of this has important implications for learning. We can represent learning as
the following ME games. It is common to represent making a prediction Y from data
X as a zero sum game between our player E and Nature: E wins if for data X provided
by Nature, E makes a prediction that the Jury judges to be correct. More generally, an
iterated learning process is a repeated zero sum game, in which E makes predictions in
virtue of some history, which one might also call a model or a set of hypotheses; if she
makes a correct prediction at round n, she reinforces her beliefs in her current history; if
she makes a wrong prediction, she adjusts it. The winning condition may be defined in
terms of some function of the scores at each learning round or in terms of some global
convergence property. Learning conceived in this way is a variant of a simple ME truth
game in which costs are assigned to individual discourse moves as in discounted ME
games.
In an ME truth game, where E develops a history h∗ over a set of facts X while A
argues for an alternative history h over X , A can successfully defend history h as long
as either the true history h∗ is (a) not learnable or (b) not uniquely learnable. In case
(a), E cannot convince the Jury that h∗ is the right history; in case (b) A can justify h
as an alternative interpretation. Consider the bias of a hardened climate change skeptic:
the ME model predicts that simply presenting new facts to the agent will not induce
him to change his history, even if to a disinterested Jury his history is clearly not in his
winning condition. He may either simply refuse to be convinced because he is not truth
interested, or because he thinks his alternative history h can explain all of the data in X
19 This option encapsulates the problem of optimizing the decision to exploit a bias that has a
certain “local” optimality or to explore the space of possible biases further. There is a large
literature on this issue [63,42,11,18,9,28].
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just as well as E’s climate science history h∗. Thus, ME games open up an unexplored
research area of unlearnable histories for certain agents.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have put forward the foundations of a formal model of interpretive
bias. Our approach differs from philosophical and AI work on dialogue that links dia-
logue understanding to the recovery of speaker intentions and beliefs [31,30]. Studies
of multimodal interactions in Human Robot Interaction (HRI) have also followed the
Gricean tradition [50,24,27]. [1,8,45]), offer many reasons why a Gricean program for
dialogue understanding is difficult for dialogues in which there is not a shared task and
a strong notion of co-operativity. Our model is not in the business of intention and belief
recovery, but rather works fromwhat contents agents explicitly commit to with their ac-
tions, linguistic and otherwise, to determine a rational reconstruction of an underlying
interpretive bias and what goals a bias would satisfy. In this we also go beyond what
current theories of discourse structure like SDRT can accomplish.
Our theoretical work also requires an empirical component on exactly how bias is
manifested to be complete. This has links to the recent interest in fake news.20 Mod-
eling interpretive bias can help in detecting fake news by providing relevant types to
check in interpretation and by providing an epistemic foundation for fake news detec-
tion by exploiting ME truth games where one can draw from various sources to check
the credibility of a story. In a future paper, we intend to investigate these connections
thoroughly.
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